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" NO ONE SHALL BE COMPELLED IN ANY CRIMINAL CASE

"NO ONE SHALL BE COMPELLED IN ANY CRIMINAL CASE TO BE A WITNESS AGAINST
HIMSELF,"
CONSIDERED WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE UNdONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTES OF IMMUNITY OR INDEMNITY.

Throughout the centuries of civilization there has been a
great problem confronting the most distinguished writers and
jurists of all nations. The foremost thought of the times. has
endeavored to solve this problem either by the principles of
logic or by the instinctive feelings of humanity. The diverse
views on this problem have all been predicated on the ultimate
principle of elevating humanity to a higher and nobler plane.
Reasons pro and con almost innumerable have been advanced
on either side and, to the minds of the reasoners, the conclusion reached has been proved beyond a question. This great
problem has been, and is nothing more nor less than, how shall
the truth be best established in a suit at law with the least
harm to the individual and the greatest good to society? This
problem embodies the whole law of evidence, not only as we
of the common law understand it, but those as well of the civil
law and of the canon law.
The law of evidence involves as many and perhaps more
intricate points in all systems of jurisprudence than any other
branch, unless it be that of pleading. Many of these questions were settled years ago, and have remained ever since
unchanged. Others have not been and are hot yet settled.
They remain still a bone of contention among lawyers and
philosophers, and frequently are a matter which leads the populace (who are told that "ignorance of the law excuses no one")
to believe that these abstruse discussions are more for the purpose of bewildering their minds than of arriving at any real and
substantial conclusion. About the question we have selected
such conditions exist. Old principles long considered estab-
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lished have been broken in upon by legislation until we are all
at sea, lawyers as well as laymen. A return to fundamental
principles will be necessary to get our bearings.
It was the custom and law of Rome, that no one except a
slave should be compelled to give testimony against himself.
One of Cicero's most noted invectives is the one against Verras,
who attempted by torture to compel a Roman citizen to testify.
Aulus Gellius, Tully and Ulpian characterize the methods
practiced upon slaves not only as cruel and inhuman, but as
producing falsehood rather than truth.
These Roman writers and speakers tell us that men in their
extremity will not hesitate to testify to an untruth; that to
compel pain of body and mind in order to secure the truth is
against the very law of nature. The law writers and causuists
of the Middle Ages endeavored to show that such was not the
case, and though some admit the rule was harsh, justice
demanded its strict application to all persons. It was reasoned
that, for very tenderness, the law could not endure that any
man should die upon the evidence of false or even a single
witness, and that, therefore, this method was contrived whereby
innocence should manifest itself by stout denial or guilt by
plain confession. There were those who had the courage to
make a protest, even at a time in which to invent some new
engine of torture was to receive the plaudits of the populace
and the rewards of the government. Beccaria, Ch. I6, with
the satire of mathematical precision, thus characterizes the
methods then in vogue: "The force of the muscles and sensibilities of the nerves of an innocent person being given, it is
required to find the degree of pain necessary to make him
confess guilt of a given crime." Disregarding all protests
under the Roman law, to comparatively modern times under
the civil law men have been compelled by the most awful
tortures to give testimony in "any criminal case."
In the trial of Prince Pierre Bonaparte' we have an example of the inquisitorial proceedings of the continent. Indeed, within a year the civilized world has been shocked and
its sense of justice outraged by the proceedings in the trial of
I Am. LAw R.v., Vol. V, p. 14.
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M. Zola at Paris, and especially has this been so with the .
people of the United States, on account of the incommunicando
to which men were subjected who ran'afoul of Spanish justice.
It is an ancient principle of the- law of evidence, as it was.
administered by our ancestors, that a witness shall not be
compelled, in any proceeding, to make disclosures or to give
testimony which will tend to incriminate him or make him
subject to fines, penalties or forfeitures. Neither Fleta, Glanville nor Bracton make any mention of the right inherent, in
every man born under the common law, to demand 'that he
shall not be compelled, in any proceeding, to give testimony
which may incriminate him. This does not argue that the
right did not exist. So great has always been the respectpaid to individual freedom among the Anglo-Saxon people,
that from the very earliest times this -right has been fundamental in their system of legal procedure and almost axiomatic.
The Norman had not set his foot on English soil many
years before the moderation of the common law became an
irtolerable check to his rapacity. By the statute of 3 Edw. I,
the dreadful punishment of peine forte et dure was introduced. This was contrived to compel an accused person
to testify, when, rather than plead, he would stand mute.
Previous to this time, in such a case, the accused was tried by
two juries; and, if found guilty by both, it was decreed he
should be punished according to the charge. Blackstone tells
us' that "if the corruption of blood and consequent escheat
in felony had been removed, the judgment of peine forte et
dure might, perhaps, have innocently remained as a monument to the savage rapacity with which the lordly tyrants of
feudalism hunted after escheats and forfeitures."
That Blackstone was mistaken, we have ample proof. In
America, where escheats never prevailed, there was a casepoor Giles Corey, when accused of witchcraft, was pressed to
death for refusing to plead.' In England the punishment of
peineforte etdure was abolished by 12 George III, c. 2o, and
C. 12,

'Bk. 4, 328.
23 Bancroft His. 93.
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the same punishment allowed for refusing to plead as in case
of conviction on the charge. Under this statute, in 1777 at
the old Baily, and in 1792 at Wells, men were hung for refusing to plead on arraignment.
It is a fact of history, too clearly evidenced to be doubted,
that the rack was commonly used as an engine of state during
the reigns of the Plantaganets and the Tudors. Woe to the
man who fell under the displeasure of the Richards, John, or
the later Henrys. Men were ruthlessly thrown into dungeons to die in awful agony, or were put upon the rack to
force from them a confession which would implicate fellowconspirators; but this was never the law of England. It was
an usurpation of the law in the hands of a sovereign who overrode the law and trampled solemn charters under foot. The
rack was never even proposed as an instrument of the law but
once. This was in the trial of Felton, during the reign of
Elizabeth, when Bishop Laud, of London, proposed the use
of the rack upon the accused to discover his accomplices in
the assassination of the Duke of Buckingham. The matter
being referred to the judges, it was unanimously agreed that,
"to the honor of the law and to the honor of the judges, the
rack could not be legally used."'
There is a great deal of evidence to show that the common
law principle always was that no one should be compelled to
incriminate himself. Coke says of Leigh's case, in Io Eliz. :
"As to Leigh's case remembered this mere recited, for it was
io Eliz., Dyer, but not in the printed book, but in his other
book, a manuscript written with his own hand, which book I
have, in which are many cases not in the printed book .
This Leigh was an attorney of the C. B. (He loved masses
as well as he did his life.) Thither he went, and would go to
hear this. And touching this matter the Ecclesiastical Judges
would have examined him on oath. He refused to answer
them. Upon this they committed him to the Fleet The judges
did then presently send for their attorney by habeas corpus,
and upon return they did, in this case, examine the matter and
said qud nemo tenetur seipsum prodere; and so for this cause
I Trial of Felton, 3 State Tr. 368-37r.
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they delivered him. (The sheriff would be always ready to
take him by the back if he once consents the matter against
himself.)" A similar decision is recorded in Hinde's case for usury,' also Burrows and other plaintiffs, for not taking an
oath
It will be seen that these cases record the most ancient decisions of which there is any record, and some of
which were merely remembered. Though not actually going
back to the time when "the memory of man runneth not to
the contrary"-the beginning of the reign of Richard, ix89still they do reach back to a time when the contrary was
,neither known nor remembered. The most important among
many modem English cases affirming this ancient rule are
the following: Sir John Friend;3 Earl of Macclesfield; ' Rex
*v.Slaney; Cates v. Hardacre.' Such we find the common
law to be as administered by the judges of the English courts.
The English Government had not learned that Englishmen
were entitled to all the rights accorded them by the common
law, wherever they might be under the jurisdiction of the
crown, until it was too late, and the King had lost his most
valuable colony. The pioneer settlers had seen the rights
and privileges they held most dear to personal freedom and
liberty entirely disregarded as to themselves. They also remembered how they or their immediate ancestors had been
compelled to leave their fatherland because of prosecutions
never recognized by the laws of England. Many of these
people were from Continental Europe, and knew by bitter experience the unlimited rapacity and savagery of the ruling
classes. They had fled from the ruling classes, that they
might have civil and religious liberty. When the minute men
fought at Lexington, suffered at Valley Forge, and finally
stood in line of attack at Yorktown, it was for the maintenance of the ancient and inalienable rights of Englishmen.
For eight years the colonists, irrespective of nationality,
I i8 E1iz.
2 13 Jac. I, 3 BulstrOde, 50.
3 13 How. St. Tr. x6.

'x6 How. St. Tr. 767.
5 Car. P. 213.
'3 Taunt. 424.
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stoutly maintained their rights against a tyrannical government. It is little wondered, then, that we find the colonists.
irrespective of previous nationality, firmly united in defence of
the ancient principles of common law.
The freedom of the colonies once secure, the people set
about also to secure the liberty which had been the ultimate
object of the Revolution. A constitution was drawn, defining
the powers of the states and -general government, and pro"viding for the administration of the new state of affairs. No
mention was made in it of the particular liberties contended
for. It contained no bill of rights on which the people could
confidently rely. This was one of the strongest arguments
against the Constitution.'
Finally the Constitution was
adopted, with the express understanding that a bill of rights
would also be proposed for adoption.' This was done at the
very first session of Congress, and ten of the proposed
amendments received the ratification of the states in a short
time and became incorporated into the Constitution. We
find that four of these had to do with the rights of the people
when a criminal accusation was brought against a man, or
any of his acts were brought to light upon which a criminal
case could be founded. 3 The third clause of the fifth amendment declares that " No person . . . shall be compelled, in
any criminal case, to be a witness against himself." The
scope and effect of this clause will be the subject of the subsequent discussion.
That no person shall be compelled to give evidence against
himself in any criminal case is but an affirmance of a common
law privilege of inestimable value.4 This is a fact of common
knowledge, and is affirmed, without exception, in the constitutions of all the states as well as of the United States. It is
stated in somewhat different words in the various places.
Being an affirmance of a broad privilege accorded by the
common law, the rule of construction must be co-extensive
I Federalist, 83, 84; Vol.

2 and 3, Elliot's Debates.
Choate, Lec. on Jefferson, Burr and Hamilton, 1858.
3
Story, Const. Sec. 3o and note; Const. Amend. 4, S, 6, 8.
2

4 Story, Const. Sec. 1788.
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with the manifest purpose, and, as far as possible, all given
the same interpretation.'
The question naturally arises, what is the interpretation to.
be given this clause, or, in other words, what is the common
law on this subject?
For a long period it was undetermined whether or not the
common law privileges extended to protect the witness against
the disclosure of facts, which would subject him to a mere
civil action. Cases were to be found in the nisipriuscourts
on either side of the controversy, varying as the equities of the
case seemed best to suggest. In i8o6 the question arose
upon the impeachment of Lord Melville, and, upon being.
referred to the Law Lords, it was ruled that the witness must
answer, though it did subject him to civil action. The question was, however, left in some doubt by a strong dissenting
opinion from four of the judges, including Lord Mansfield.
It was later settled in conformity with the opinion of the
majority of the judges by 46 Geo. III, c. 37. In the'United
States the great weight of authority is now in conformity with
the rule as settled by statute in England. 2
Whether a witness will be compelled to answer a question
which will disgrace him, has been decided in the negative in
two very early cases in the history of American Law, and one
late case in the District Court of the United States for the
Northern District of Illinois. It may be said of these rulings,
with all due respect to the eminent and honorable judge who
decided the late case, that the true rule, as supported by the
great weight of authority, and, to our mind, the sound reason
of justice and public policy, is: "That where the transaction
to which the witness is interrogatedforms any part of the issue
to be tried, the witness will be obliged to give evidence, howCounselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547.
Robinson v. Neal, 3 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 2X3; Stoddert v. Manning,
2 Har. & G. (Md.) 147; Alexander v. Knox, 7 Ala. 5o3; Naas v. Van-

swearingen, 7 S. & R. (Pa.) x92 ; Steward v. Turner, 3 Fdw. Ch. (N. Y.)

o
458; Planter's Bank v. George, 6 Mar. (La.) 67 , overruling Orleans
Nay. Co. v. New Orleans, z Mar. (La.) 23.
3 Com. v. Gibbes, 3 Yeates (Pa.), 429 (1802); Galbreath v. Richelberger, 3 Id. 515 (18o3) ; U. S. v. James, 6o Fed. 257.
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c:'er strongly it may reflect on his character." '
A different
rule- might deprive parties of the most necessary and urgent
testimony for defence against a criminal accusation, penalty or
forfeiture, and thus subject an accused to the very same disgrace, which it was designed to ward off from the witness
called to give testimony. The good accomplished in sutch a
case would be co-extensive with the harm it was designed to
obviate. But if the party called as a witness cannot be made
to suffer pains and penalties in regard to anything to which
he may testify by reason of the Statute of Limitations, a pardon, an acquittal or conviction, then the rule as announced
in The United States v. James, supra, does not accomplish
good co-extensive with the harm. Pains and penalties and
the consequent disgrace attached must always, in foro conscientiz, be regarded as a greater evil than mere disgrace.
Judge Grosscup himself says, in the James case, supra:
Happily the day when this immunity (from disgrace) is
needed seems to be over. It is difficult for us, who live in a
time when there are few, if any, definitions of crime that do
not meet with the approval of universal intelligence and conscience, to appreciate these conceptions of our fathers." We
can see no reason, therefore, for applying the rule now, which,
it has been shown, is against the great weight of authority.
If the reason for a rule never general has become obsolete by
the changes in the composition of society-as Judge Grosscup
admits society has changed-then the old maxim will apply:
41' Cessante rationc, cessat lc.r."

But when the evidence asked for goes further than to subject the witness to a civil action or tends to disgrace him, and
opens the way for prosecution in a criminal case, the authorities are unanimous in holding that, under the common law
and also under the constitutional declaration of the common
law, the witness cannot be compelled to testify. The authoriI Greenleaf Ev., Sec. 454; Phil. & Am. Ev., 917 ; Jennings v. Prentice,
39 Mich. 421 ; Moline Wagon Co. v. Preston, 35 Ill. App. 358; Weldon
v. Burtch, 12 Ill. 374; Clementine v. State, 14 Mo. 112; People v.
Mather, 4 Wend. 250; Hill v. State, 4 Ind. 112; King v. Edwards, 4 T.
R. 44o; Lohman v. People, i Comstock, 385; Roberts v. Allpratt, 22
Eng. Com. L. 288.
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ties are so numerous and general on this point that it is considered unnecessary to refer to them here. A collection of a
large number of cases will be found in 29 Am. & Eng. Ency,
of L. 835.
To what extent does this rule go? How may a witness
know when he can claim his privilege? This can be answered in no better way than in the words of Chief Justice
Marshall, at the trial of Aaron Burr.'
This case has been followed in the United States in all its
branches except, perhaps, where the Chief Justice says: "And
if he say on oath he cannot answer without accusing himself,
he cannot be compelled to answer." Some courts have held.
that they are not bound by the witness' sworn statement
unless reasonable grounds be made to appear that the testimony asked for would tend to incriminate him.' This We:
believe to be the- true rule, as gathered from the whole of
Chief Justice Marshall's argument in the Burr case If the
witness should be able to escape testifying by a sworn statement that what he would say would tend to incriminate him,
an obdurate witness would have it within his power to refuse
testimony on a mere pretence.
But yet the court ought
and will allow the witness great latitude in judging for himself;' for if he pointed out the direct reason, the privilege
would be worthless.' The relation of the witness to the subject of inquiry and character and scope of the question must
all be considered.! In this case it was held a student need
not explain in what department of a university he was studying when the subject of inquiry was the death of a waiter at
1 r Burr's Trial, 244.
2 Regina v. Garbett, z Den. Cir. Ct. 236; Reg. v. Boyes, x Best and.

Smith, 31r ; Com. v. Braynard. Thach. Cir. Ct. (Mass.) x46; Mahaukee
v. Cleland, 76 Ia. 4or ; State v. Lonsdale, 48 Wis. 348 ; State v. Thaden,
"•
43 Minn. 253.
3 Stevens v. State, 50 Kan. 712; People v. Forbes, 143 N. Y. 219; Jarvin v. Scammon, 29 N. H. 28o; Chamberlain v. Wilson, 12 Vt. 491;
Taylor Bv., Sec. 1548.
People v. Mather, 4 Wend. 229; Murluzzi v. Gleason, 59 Md. 214;
Southard v. Rexford, 6 CoM. 254; Fisher v. Ronalds, 16 Eng. L. & Eq.
418; Burr's Trial, supra.
5 Taylor v. Forbes, Justice, x43 N. Y. ix 9 .
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a class banquet from the effect of poisonous gases introduced
into-the banquet hall by a tube firom a room below.
It will be seen that the protection thrown around the wit-

ness is complete in every particular.

He may not be com-

pelled even to furnish a single link upon which a criminal

prosecution can be grounded; and it has been held that this
protection is extended to other cases than those where a
person is called as a witness in a case being tried in court.
In Counselman v. Hitcltcock I it was held that the witness
could not be compelled to incriminate himself when called as
a witness before a grand jury investigation. It has also been
held that the same rule applies to an investigation by a
legislative committee.'
Both these cases have been decided
since the New York cases, ' in which we have the narrow construction, and we conceive that they lay down the true rule.
In Taylor v. Forbes,Justice,4 decided since the Counselman
case, sup-a, the rule.as laid down in the Counselman case is
approved as authority. It may. be inferred that, since the
rule applies to the above cases, the protection afforded a witness extends to any kind of an investigation wherein the
party called to give testimony may be compelled to do so, if
he does not thereby incriminate himself.
The delivery of Blackstone's Commentaries on the laws of
England, as lectures at Oxford University, was listened to by
a young man, who was afterwards to become famous as his
early instructor's chief opponent. This was Jeremy Bentham,
the soul of whose life was reform. Reform in law and legal
procedure, such as penal laws, laws of property, prison management, all came under his comprehensive sway. Blackstone
was attacked by him in scathing terms. He did not believe
with the great commentator that the laws of England were
perfect as they stood. A large majority of the reforms
accomplished during the present century along the lines just
mentioned, have been the direct result of the plan laid down
'142

U. S., 547.

emery's Case, 107 Mass. 172.
3 People v. Kelly, 24 N. Y. 74; People v. Sharp, 107 N. Y. 427.
S43 N. Y. 219.
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by this great student. His best known and most elaborate
work is on evidence. In it he inveighed against the many
artificial restrictions put upon witnesses by the common law,.

such as the rules of exclusion disqualifying a wife or husbind
as a witness against the other, the requirements of religious
belief in a witness, the rule.prohibiting a person from testifying
for himself, the rule granting the privilege to a witness not to
incriminate himself, and many others of a similar nature.' To
his influence may be attributed the abolishment of the rule
which "protects any witness from answers which would tend
to incriminate him" in India, though still retained in England. I
The rule we are discussing has been changed in some.
respects in England by taking away the privilege in 'some
cases, and giving indemnity in others.' The United States,
as well as many of the states, has endeavored to give indemnity to witnesses who shall testify to facts which will tend to
incriminate them. .We believe none of the states have ever
passed a general statute in this particular, they having confined
the scope of their legislation to particular cases. The United
States, however, endeavored to pass a general statute giving
indemnity in all cases where a witness was called in its courts
or had been called in any foreign court. Indemnity statutes
are necessary in this country because of our general constitutional provisions granting the privilege to a witness of refusing
to testify against himself A statute compelling a witness to
testify would clearly be unconstitutional.
In England, where the legislative power is supreme, there
are no restrictions. Parliament with the Queen is sovereign.
It may take away the privilege under discussion in particular
cases, or in all cases, or grant immunity or.indemnity in some
or'all, as it is deemed best for the enforcement of law, preservation of order and upbuilding of society. Chief Justice Coke
says' that f"It [parliament] has sovereign and uncontrolled
authority in the making, conferring, enlarging, restraining,
1

Wilson, Modern English Law, 254, et seg.

Wilson, Modern English Law, 256.
a See 2 Taylor Ev., par. x455, for a list of such statutes.
43

Inst. 36.
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abrogating, repealing, reviving and expounding of laws concerning matter of all possible denominations, ecclesiastical or
temporal, civil, maritime or criminal." Sir Matthew Hale
says of it in his work, "Of Parliament," page 79: " This
being the highest and greatest court over which none other
can have jurisdiction in the kingdom, if by any means a misgovernment should fall upon them, the subjects of this government are lefi without all manner of remedy."
In some of the states where the statutes of indemnity have
been called in question, and also in the United States, the
courts of last resort have held them unconstitutional, because
they were not broad enough to guarantee to the accused
party the full and complete immunity which was necessary
under the constitution; in other words, that " in view of the
constitutional provision a statutory enactment (of this character) to be valid must afford absolute immunity against future
prosecution for the offence to which the question relates." 1
In other states the same principle has been enunciated, but
it has been there held that the statute was constitutional,
because it granted "absolute immunity." 2 Without stating
the above principle there have been a great many cases holding such statutes constitutional, because the statutes were as
broad as the evil they were intended to remedy. ' The reason
advanced in some of the decisions holding such statutes constitutional is that the provision of the state constitution in
question is not so broad as that of other states in which a like
statute has been held unconstitutional. No mention of this
reason is made, however, in the New York cases in which
"any criminal case" is construed so narrowly. Since the
Counselman case, supra, holding that the intent of all the conI Counselman v. Hitchcock,
Cullen v. Commonwealth,

172;

75 Va.

142 U. S. 547; Emery's Case, 107 Mass.
24

Grat. 624; Temple v. Commonwealth,

See, also, Boyd v. U. S., zx6 U. S. 616.
2
State v. Nowell, 58 N. H. 314; La Fontaine v. Southern Underwriters' Ass'n, 83 N. C. 132.
s Quarles v. State, x3 Ark. 3o7; Higdon v. Head, 14 Geo. 255; Wilkins
v. Malone, 14 Ind. r53; People v. Kelly, 24 N. Y. 74; People v. Sharp,
107 N. Y. 427; Ex parte Buskett, xo6 Mo. 602; Bedgood v. State, zis
Ind. 275; Kain v. State, 16 Tex. App. 282; Hirsch v. State, 8 Baxt.
(Tenn.) 89.
892.
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stitutions is practically the same, that contention is hardly
tenable.
Immediately after the decision in the Counselman case, Con:gress passed a statute believed to satisfy all the requirements
of that case. After the statute states that no one shall be
excused from testifying or producing books and papers before
the Interstate Commerce Commission, on the ground that such
evidence would tend to incriminate the witness, it says: "But
no person shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or
forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing
concerning which he may testify, produce evidence, documentary or otherwise, before said commission or in obedience'
to its subpoena or the subpoena of. either of them or in any
such case or proceeding."'
Undoubtedly, the author of the
statute believed he had removed the last obstacle in the way
of the Interstate Commerce Commission in securing evidence
of the illegal practices of the railroads, on which to found an
indictment against the officials. This statute was, however,
declared unconstitutional by Judge Grosscup, but was upheld
by a later case.3 Although we believe the James case was
rightly decided, we cannot concur in the reasons advanced
therefor, except, perhaps, the first one, that a right given by
the constitution cannot be taken away by statute. The second ground that to answer the question asked would tend to
disgrace the witness has previously been shown by the great
weight of authority to be erroneous; the further reason that
the statute amounts to a pardon and that an accused need
not plead a pardon unless he desires so to do, is untenable on the authority of the case cited to support the contention, United States v. Wrison.4
In that case Chief Justice
Marshall does hold an accused need not plead a pardon from
the President unless he sees fit. Of such a pardon the court
could not take judicial notice, but if it had been such a pardon
that the court must notice it, then it would have been effective
Stat. L. 443, cl. 83.
James v. U. S., 6o Fed. 257.
3
Brown v. Walker, x61 U. S.
4 7 Peters, xSo.
127
2

59,

fourjudges dissenting.
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withlout being pleaded.1 In the James case, stpra, the statute
relied on was a Federal statute, one of which the court must
take judicial notice. The accused was not compelled to plead
it. As to the first reason advanced in the James case, I said
"perhaps" it was meritorious.
In Kendrick v. Commonwealth2 there is a strong opinion by Lacey and Richardson,
J.J., dissenting on the same ground advanced by Judge Grosscup in the James case, supra. They hold it is not competent
for the legislature to take away a right granted by the constitution through an act of immunity because thereby the constitution is annulled by the legislative power. This opinion
has more force when coupled with the dissent of Nicholson,
C. J. and Turner, J., in Hirsch v. State.3 It states that "We
hold the law does not abrogate the offence until the witness
has testified, but that after the witness has testified the law
then virtually operates to abrogate it and shield him from
prosecution. The act of testifying constitutes the abrogation
of the offence under the law. This only occurs after the witness has voluntarily waived his constitutional right to refuse
to testify. If he does not voluntarily waive his right he cannot be deprived of it by compulsory law." This is a logical
and just conclusion. It does not infringe the personal privilege of the accused as given him by the constitution. He
may testify or not as he sees fit, but once having voluntarily
given testimony, which would tend to incriminate him, -the
statute acts as a pardon and he may not thereafter be prosecuted for anything upon which he may give evidence. It is
a statutory way of making effective a prosecuting attorney's
promise to refrain from prosecution in return for state's evidence.
Otherwise the agreement so frequently made by
states' attorneys to secure this kind of evidence has no force
whatever. Neither the court nor prosecuting attorney can
offer a witness such indemnity. It must be guaranteed to
him positively by statute.4
See, also, 4 Black Com.

402.

78 Va. 490.
3 8 Baxt. (Tenn.) 89 .
'Temple v. Commonwealth, 78 Va. 8xg.
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We rest our conclusions on a different basis and one which
we believe has never, except in one case, been advanced by
any of the courts as a reason for *their decisions concerning
the constitutionality of these statutes. Perhaps this is for the
reason that, except in Brown v. Walker, supra, the exact
point has never arisen in any of the cases in the states, and
other sufficient grounds have always been found in the Supreme Court of the United States. We believe the true rule
is, that a statute of the kind in question must give "absolute
immunity" to the unwilling witness, as shown heretofore, and
that the dissenting judges in Brown v. Walker, sufira, took
the right position in their dissenting opinion.
There are offences which are not* only a transgression of
the laws of one jurisdiction, but also of another jurisdiction, and so far as that act is concerned, these jurisdictions
may be entirely independent Or a person may be called to
testify in a case, not necessarily criminal in its nature, which
will involve facts tending to incriminate the witness in another jurisdiction over which the court or legislature in which
the witness is called has no authority.
We do not propose to enter into an extended discussion of
the police powers of the states nor of the extent of the power
granted by the states to the Federal Government. It is only
necessary to show that a state of facts may arise which would
lead to the conditions just mentioned and we have substantiated our contention.
Whether the states emerged from the control of the crown,
and stood out after the troublesome times of the revolution as
independent sovereignties, has been a question involving almost
every manner of speculative discussion. It is true that they
have never been recognized as such except, possibly, when, for
a short time, Rhode Island and North Carolina had the liberty
to assume complete powers of sovereignty. They uadoubtedly had this power, and though it was never assumed, the
first remained outside the Union for over a year, and the latter about six months. I It is said by Chief Justice Jay: "From
the crown of Great Britain the sovereignty of their country
"Coo1ey, Con. Limit., pp. 8, 9; Story, Sec.

271-280.
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passed to the people of it; and it was not then an uncommon
opinion that the unappropriated lands, which belonged to the
crown, passed not to the state within whose limits it was situated,
but to the whole people. On whatever principle this opinion
rested, it did not give way to the other, and thirteen sovereignties were considered as emerged from the principles of the
Revolution, combined with local convenience and consideration." 1 Before the adoption of the Constitution, the states had
all the attributes of sovereignties.'
But emerging from the
principles of the Revolution, which were very ill defined, the
states at once in the "warmth of mutual affection" looked to
each other for a continuation of the support given in a time of
great need, and the moral obligation bound them together in
a new compact. ' This compact is said by Van Buren' to
have been an heroic though, perhaps, a lawless act. Yet it is
declared by Chief Justice Chase, in Texas v. White, 5 when discussing the status of the states which seceded during the Civil
War, that he can conceive of nothing more nearly a unity than
a "perpetual union "made "more perfect." Notwithstanding
these divergent opinions they will help us to understand more
clearly the respective powers of the state and Federal Government.
It is declared by the tenth amendment to the Constitution
that, "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution nor prohibited by it to the states are reserved to
the states respectively or to the people." Although "the
people" are in some parts of the Constitution interpreted to
mean the whole people of the United States, collectively represented, as "We, the people," in the preamble of the Constitution, in this amendment it was never so intended. Citizenship of a state and citizenship of the United States are entirely
separate and distinct. 6 "The Government of the United States
can claim no powers which are not granted to it by the Con1
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dal. 470.
2License Cases, 5 Howard, 587.
3
4

Federalist, No. 53, by Madison.
Pol. Par. 50.

57 Wal. 724.

6Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36.
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stitution; and the powers actually granted must be such as
are expressly given or given by necessary implications." 1 "It
has never been questioned, so far as I know, that the Americanlegislatures have the same unlimited power in regard to legislation which resides in the British Parliament except where
they are restrained by a written constitution. This must be
conceded, I think, to be a fundamental principle in the political
organization of the American states. We cannot comprehend
how upon principle it should be otherwise. The people must,
of course, possess all legislative power originally. They have
committed this in the most general and unlimited manner to
the several state legislatures, saving only such restrictions as
are imposed by the Constitution of the United States or of the
particular state in question." 2 The principle upon which the
judges have gone is aptly stated by Chief Justice Marshall in
Gibbons v. Ogden, supra: "The genius and character of the
whole government seems to be that its action is to be applied
to all the external concerns of the nation, and to those internal
concerns which effect the states generally; but not to those
which are completely within a particular state which do not
effect other states, and with which it is not necessary to interfere for the purpose of executing some of the general powers
of the government." Thus there grows out of the theory of
our government a complicated system of sovereignties, each
exercising exclusive jurisdiction within its own sphere, but
both over the same territory
If the general government is supreme in its sphere, it follows
that any statute passed by it in conformity with its powers
must be given precedence over any state law or constitution
which conflicts with it.' The last case cited is authority on
I Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, x Wheat. 326; Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Id.
187 ; Calder v. Bull, 3 Dal. 386; Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wal. 713;
Weister v. Hade, 52 Pa. 477; Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, xir Peters, 316.
s Thorpe v. Rut. & Bur. R. R. Co. 27 Vt 142; Mason v. Waite, 4
Scam. (Ill.) 134; Sears v. Cottrell, 5 Mich. 251; Legget v. Hunter, i9
N. Y. 445.
3 Cooley, Const. Lint. p. 2.
4Marbury v. Madison, I Cranch, x37; Sturges v. Crowninschield, 4
Wheaton, 122; Exfiarte Fames, 2 Story, C. C. 332.
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the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal courts within their
sphere. Perhaps, however, the strongest case o'n that subject
is that of Abelman v. Booth. ' In that case Booth was held by
United States Marshal Abelman for violating the fugitive
slave law. The State Court of Wisconsin issued a writ of
uzbeas corpus, and the Supreme Court of the state held that
the writ would lie on the ground that the Federal statute under
which the prisoner was arrested was unconstitutional. The
State Court even went so far as to order the clerk to make no
return on the writ of error or to enter any order upon the
journals or records of the court concerning the same. This
power was expressly declared on appeal to the Supreme Court
of the United States not to be within the sphere of the State
Court. It was said by Chief Justice Taney: "When a court,
so elevated in its position, has pronounced a judgment which,
if it could be maintained, would subvert the very foundation
of our government, it seemed to be the duty of this court
to show plainly the graye error into which the State
. ...
Court has fallen."'
The general government is supreme, however, in its sphere
only. Its power is circumscribed by the Constitution, and any
act, legislative or judicial, outside this sphere, is void. There
the states are supreme. In the forty-fifth number of the Federalist it is said: "The powers of the states would extend to
all objects, which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concerns
the lives, liberties and properties of the people, and internal
order, improvement and prosperity of the state." 3 The states
exercise full and complete power over everything connected
with the social and internal condition, which relates to moral
Every law for the restraint or punishand political welfare.'
of public peace, must come
the
preservation
ment of crime, or
5
A writ of habeas corpus was
within the power of the states.
taken out for a man drafted into the military service of the
121 How. 5o6.
2

See, also, Tarbel's Case, 13 Wal. 397; In re Spangler, ii Mich. 299.
sMayor of New York v. Milne, ii Peters, 132; Calder v. Bull, 3
Dallas, 386.
1License Cases, 5 How. 588.
5 License Cases, 5 How. 631.
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United States in Michigan. The judge said in deciding the
case adversely to the writ: "*The Federal Government and
state government exist as independently as the g6vernment of
the several states; each acting within its sphere is foreign to
the other and independent, and this principle extends to the
courts of each. . . . We have two governments, a state
government and a Federal government; each of these is
supreme within its sphere. . . . Neither is supreme in the
sense that it has power to dictate or control the other when

acting within its appropriate sphere. Each is supreme in its
own sphere. Neither is supreme within the sphere of the
other." ' "The powers of the general government and of the
state, although both exist and are exercised within the same
territorial limits, are yet separate and distinct sovereignties
acting separately and independently of each other, within their
respective spheres, and the sphere of action appropriated to
the United States is as far beyond the reach of the judicial
process issued by a state judge or state court as if the line
of division was traced by land marks and monuments visible
to the eye. The Federal and state governments are supreme
in their respective sphere; first, in delegated powers; second,
those not delegated, and any act beyond of either is null and
void." 2
Perhaps at this point, if not before, the reader has come, as
we have, to believe with the judges of the Supreme Court of
Indiana: "First, the states are to exist with independent
powers within their sphere. Second, the Federal Government
is to exist with independent powers within its sphere." This
doctrine, which has pervaded our whole system of government,
seems, however, to be fast losing ground, and in a late decision
of the Supreme Court of the United States 3 to have been
entirely overthrown. Were it not that the opinion of itself,
by a bare majority of the court, states that the ground taken
was hardly necessary to the proper decision of the case, and
also that four judges make a vigorous dissent, the conception
'IInre Spangler, II MiCh. 299.
'License Cases, S How. 588.
3 Brown

v. Walker, sup ra.
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of "State Sovereignty and National Unity " would be a thing
only to be remembered.
In respect to some transgressions, it sometimes occurs that
not only the provisions of the law of the United States are
violated, but also the same act is a violation of the statute
of the state. One fact or series of facts may constitute two
crimes, each of which is an offence against separate and independent jurisdictions, so far as these facts are concerned, and
a prosecution in one will be no bar in the other. Thus, nearly
all the states provide a penalty for the offence of counterfeiting. This is also punishable by an act of Congress. Likewise
with the offence of assaulting a United States marshal or hindering him in the execution of a process. So, also, where
larceny is committed in one state and the goods taken into
another. The person may commit two crimes punishable in
two jurisdictions, which, if both were within one jurisdiction,
and prosecution were attempted for both in different places or
in the same place at different times, a conviction for one can
be pleaded in bar to the other.'
Since the control of railroads in the matter of unjust discriminations has come to be a common subject of legislative
action, both state and national, providing penalties for nonperformance of certain duties relative thereto, it will no doubt
be a subject soon coming before the courts for adjudication,
in both state and Federal jurisdiction. As interstate and intrastate commerce are so closely related, an investigation in
either jurisdiction is not only liable but most likely to involve
facts tending to incriminate a witness in the other.
Section No. 86o of Revised Statutes of the United States
was a general statute of immunity, or proposed such. It
was declared unconstitutional in Counselman v. Hitchcock,
supra, as not broad enough to give absolute immunity even
in the Federal courts. This statute proposes to give immunity
1 Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. 410; Prigg v. Pa., 16 Peters, 540; City of N. Y.
v. Milne, ii Peters, 142 ; Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Peters, 243; Houston v.
Moore, 5 Wheaton, I; White v. Commonwealth, 4 Bin. 418; Stearns v.
United States, 2 Paine C. C. 300; U. S. v. Holloday, 3 Wal. 407; Moore
v. State of Ill., 14 How, 13.

98

" NO ONE SHALL BE COMPELLED IN ANY CRIMINAL CASE

for any "pleading, discovery or evidence obtained from a party
or witness by means of any judicial proceeding in"
this or any.
foreign country." It was the intention of the legislators that
evidence might be demanded, when necessary, of a character
tending to incriminate in any proceeding, civil or criminal,
giving the party producing the same immunity for anything to
which he might testify. Properly stated, to give "absolute
immunity" in the Federal courts, what would be the effect of
such a statute? A witness might be called on in any kind of
judicial proceeding and asked for evidence tending to incriminate himself. He demands his constitutional privilege and is
shown the statute purporting to give him absolute immunity.
Thereupon he "makes it reasonablyclear" that the evidence
called for will be a link in the chain of facts which will lead
to his conviction in. a court entirely independent, so far as the
jurisdiction of Congress is concerned. Has he absolute
immunity? The same reasoning will apply to a general
statute of immunity in any of the state courts.
In Brown v. Walker 1 the Supreme Court holds the statute,
27 Stat. L. 443, Chap. 83, constitutional.
The opinion holds
that the prisoner who refused to testify before the Interstate
Commerce Commission, on the ground that he would incriminate himself by so doing, was not technically within its terms,
but says that even though he was, the statute last mentioned
gave him absolute immunity for anything to which he might
testify. This not only in the Federal courts, but also, since a
Federal statute is the supreme law of the land, in the state
courts, and hence he must testify.
A large part of the argument in Brown v. Walker, supra,
is given to the citing of cases and extracts from state courts;
notably State v. Nowell 2 and Kendrick v. Commonwealth. These cases argue at length that a particular state statute in
question gives absolute immunity from prosecution to anything
to which the witness might testify.
If the reasoning in
Brown v. Walker is sound, and the Federal power is supreme,
2 x6z U. S. 591.

2 58 N. H. 314.
3 78 Va. 49 o .

TO BE A WITNESS AGAINST HIMSELF."

how shall a state grant absolute immunity? Suppose the
state statute of immunity applied to a prosecution generally,
and a witness was called in a state court concerning an inquiry, as to a railroad not complying with a statute in regard
to weighing. 1 He claims his privilege on the ground of a
possible prosecution under the Interstate Commerce Law.
The Federal power is supreme; the state power subject to it;
the state grant absolute immunity? Is not this "reducio ad
absurdum?" In this far reaching decision, Brown v. Walker,
we have Queen v. Boyes' cited as showing a mere possibility
of prosecution is insufficient and that the danger must be real
and appreciable; also that we having adopted certain principles of natural justice from the mother country, a certain
construction there should be ours; citing Catlhcartv. Robinson, 3 McDonald v. Hovey.' We stand ready to admit both
propositions in that case, and wish to carry the last rule
over to another case from the mother country, where the
danger was appreciablewhen made "reasonably clear." This
case was decided a little later than Queen v. Boyes, supra, but
for our purpose at the same time. The United States Government, just after the Civil War, brought proceedings in an
English court to get possession of a fund held by one McRea
in England as an agent of the Confederate States. When
called as a witness McRea stood on his privilege granted by
the common law and pleaded a United States statute which
might subject him, as a promoter of the Confederate cause, to
forfeiture of goods. The case went off on other grounds, but
it was distinctly argued at length that McRea, having pleaded
the statute, could not be compelled to testify concerning anything tending to subject him to forfeiture.'
We conceive that
such a case might arise in America and certainly there is no
power in such independent sovereignties to grant immunity
from the laws of the other. Even the Federal Government
Starr & Curtis An. Statutes, Ill. Chap. i14, pp. 139, 140.
I B. & S., 311, 321, decided May 27, I861.
3 5 Peters, 264.
4 I o U. S. 619.
' U. S. v. McRea, L. R. 3 Ch. Appeal, 79, by Lord Chelmsford.
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cannot say "No person shall be prosecuted or subjected to
any forfeiture, etc., for or on account of any transgression,
etc., the aforesaid commission, etc." -if that person's testimony
will make him liable, criminally, under the laws of a foreign
nation, as in the case of McRea.
The chief argument, as we understand the case of Brown
v. Walker, for the position of the majority of the court, is, that
by Article 6 of the Constitution, the Federal law-making power
is made supreme.' These cases are all on the power of Congress to suspend the running of a state statute of limitations
during the continuance of hostilities and when local courts
are closed. The statutes were generally upheld on the principle of the war power granted to. Congress.
It will be
found, however, on reading Hanger v. Abbot,2 that the same
court declared that state statutes of limitations do not run at
such a time, regardless of any Federal statutes on the subject.
The Federal statute was, therefore, merely declaratory of what
had previously been the law. The cases above referred to
do not, therefore, support the position taken in Brown v.
Walker.
It is admitted that treaties made by the Federal Government are the supreme law of the land. They are made so
by the Second Clause of Article 6 of the Constitution, when
"they shall be made under authority of the United States."
We are not ready to admit, however, that treaties receive
their supreme power from this clause alone. The "authority
of the United States" is found elsewhere in the Constitution.
By the First Clause of Section IO of Article I the states are
prohibited from "entering into any treaty alliance or confederation, grant letters of marque and reprisal," and by the
Second Clause of Section 2 of Article 2 the President and
Senate are vested with the power to make treaties. Treaties
always relate to the "external affairs" referred to by Justice
Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden, supra, concerning which affairs
the states have nothing to do. Thus it becomes necessary

I Stewart v. Kahn, xl WaL 493; U. S. v. Willey, ii Wal. 508; Mayfield v. Richards, ri5 U. S. 137.
2 6 Wal. 532.
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oftentimes, as the political exigencies of the nation require,
that agreements in the form of treaties shall be" made with a
foreign nation inimical to the interests of this or that state.
The framers of our fundamental rules of government were
wise enough to see this, and amply provided for it by making
treaties the supreme law of the land.
Can it anywhere be shown in the Constitution that the
states are prohibited from exercising the legislative function
except in special cases? In Article 6 "The Constitution and
laws made in pursuance thereof" are made the supreme law of
the land. By virtue of what power granted by the states can
it be said that, in pursuance of which, Federal statutes shall
be supreme over the states in all things, as the decision in
Brown v. Walker would indicate they are? or, to be more
specific, if that decision is not meant to be carried so far, that
Congress can control state courts so far as the prosecution of
crime is concerned, or so far as the admission of certain kinds
of evidence is concerned ? There are a large number of
cases in the state courts along this line, but we know of none
except Brown v. Walker, in the Supreme Court of the United
States. Most if not all of the cases in the state courts are on
the power of the Federal Government to tax the processes of
a state court, and they are uniformly against this proposition
except one-Liederkranz v. Scliemann '-and this case does
not refer to Walton v. Bryenth,2 decided a short time previously in exactly the opposite way. Neither of these cases
have a full or practically any discussion. All or nearly all
the others of these cases referred to cite at length McCuock
v. Maryland,3 where Chief Justice Marshall says "the
power to tax is the power to destroy," and hence decides
that the states cannot tax the agencies of the Federal Government. He also says that it makes no difference that the
tax is low and may not be a burden. It is the power to
destroy at which he aims. Such being the case, these state
decisions go on the principle that states, their courts and the
125 How. Prac. N. Y. 388.
224 How. Prac. N. Y. 35.

'4 Wheaton, 316.
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means of exercising governmental functions have the constitutional right to exist, and they hold that the Federal Government has no power to use a means which may in the end
destroy what the state has a right to enjoy. ' In the last case
cited we have a unanimous opinion from the Supreme Court
of Michigan, when that court had some of the most illustrious judges of any court of America on its bench-Campbell, Cooley, Christiancy and Martin. We append here a part
of Justice Campbell's opinion:
"And the question we are called upon to decide is, therefore, whether Congress has power to put an end to the -exercise of the judicial power of the states."
"Presented in this form, the inquiry involves little short of
an absurdity. It is one of the cardinal principles of political
science that no government can exist without a judicial system . . . A state without courts to enforce its own .laws is
an impossibility, and if Congress can destroy or control the
state judiciary it can utterly abrogate the state itself."
"No one would contend that the system of government established by the Constitution of the United States can possibly permit of any diminution by the general government of
any of the functions which are left under state control. The
judicial powers, like other powers of the Union, are enumerated. They do not cover any considerable number of these
subjects which concern the ordinary interests of the people.
They punish no ordinary local crimes against the peace and
good order of society committed within the states, and they
can entertain jurisdiction in no ordinary litigation between
members of the same community. . . . Our whole system
is based upon the principle that local affairs must be administered by state authority, unless where peculiar circumstances
have led to the establishment of definite exceptions resting on
special reasons of public policy. The same power which established the departments of the general government determined that the local governments should also exist for their
ISmith

v. Short, 40 Ala. 385; Warren v. Paul, 22 Ind. 281; Jones et

al. v. state of Keep, 19 Wis. 369; Sayles v. Davis, 22 Wis. 225 ; Fifeld
v. Close, 15 Mich. 5o5.
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own purposes, and made it impossible to protect the people in
their common interests without them.... There is nothing
in the Constitution which can be made to admit of any interference by Congress with the secure existence of any state
authority within its lawful bounds."
If the Federal Government may not destroy state courts or
control their evidence by taxation, which must necessarily be
by statute, then we can see no way in which it would be possible for them to control the states or their courts directly by
legislation, as is attempted by 27 Stat. L. 443, Chap. 83, if
the decision in Brown v. Walker is right
We are not informed of an attempt by any of the states to
pass a general statute of immunity. It may be argued that,
where these statutes relate only to transgressions of a particular kind, that the foregoing reasoning may not apply., This
objection seems to have merit. The statute may relate only
to bribery, as in Illinois, 1 or the state police, as formerly in
Massachusetts,' or the violation of the Interstate Commerce
Law, as in the Federal jurisdiction.3 These are offences
against the particular jurisdiction alone, where no testimony
relative to the issue would tend to criminate, it would seem,
in any other jurisdiction. But who can say where such testimony would lead? Suppose, in order to investigate a question
of unjust discrimination under the Interstate Commerce Law,
a railroad official were asked for certain weights of grain
shipped by different parties. He refuses to answer, on the
ground that it would tend to incriminate him; and he makes
it reasonably clear that the answer would tend to incriminate
him, or subject him to a penalty in Illinois' or some other one
of the states. A charge of bribery in the State of Illinois
might, in the investigation of it, lead to a demand for testimony which, considering "the relation of the witness to the
subject-matter of inquiry and character and scope of the question," would tend to disclose a link in the chain of evidence
1

Chap. 69, Criminal Code.

3 Emery's Case, sufira.
3 27 Stat. L. 443, Chap. 83.
' Starr & Curtis An. Sta., Chap.

114,

pp. 1399 140.
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upon which the witness might be prosecuted outside of the
state jurisdiction. Of course, the witness must make it reasonably clear that such is the case.*
As a corollary of the principle which has been mentioned,
viz., that the witness must make it reasonably clear that the
testimony asked for would tend to incriminate him, the party
called as a witness must, in order to secure his constitutional
privilege, plead the law of a foreign nation if the penalty of
such law is the one from which he demands immunity. I The
rule would be the same if the law of another of the states of
the Union was relied on, and such law in any way was different from or in any way changed the common law.. If,
however, the law of the other state was a common law principle, it would not be necessary to plead it to secure immunity
from it, because the common law will be presumed to be the
law of the sister state.' The rule would be otherwise if a
witness in a state court relied on a Federal statute. State
courts take judicial notice of the acts of Congress. 3 A witness
demanding his privilege on a statute of which the trial court
does not take judicial notice need only bring such a statute
to the notice of the court in order to demand his privilege.
This was decided by Lord Chelmsford in Tke United States v.
McRea, supra.
The reader will have noticed that pardons, acquittals, convictions and statutes of limitations have been mentioned as
protecting a witness against any prosecution to which any
matter he might testify to would subject him. The question
as to whether an accused can be prosecuted on the same
charge after an acquittal or conviction was settled early in the
history of our law, and is made doubly sure bythe very general
constitutional provision, that an accused shall not be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb on the same charge. A large
'King of Two Sicilies v. Wilcox, i Sim. (N. S.) 3o, by Lord Cranworth.
I Storey, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 36; Williams v. Wade, x Metc. 82;
Abell v. Douglass, 4 Denio, 305; Kernot v. Ayer, ii Mich. i8r; Schurman v. Marley, 29 Ind. 458; Mendenhall v. Gately, 18 Ind. x49.
3
Murry v. City of Butte, 7 Mont. 61.
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number of courts have also decided that a pardon or a statute
of limitation is a bar to future prosecution.
Thus a party called upon to give testimony tending to incriminate himself cannot claim his privilege when a pardon,
acquittal, conviction or the statutes of limitation intervene to
protect him. Where the statutes ot limitation are relied on,
however, to compel a party to testify, it is not enough to show
that the time necessary to the operation of the statute has
elapsed without conviction, but it must be affirmatively shown
that no prosecution is then pending.'
If the offence sought
to be brought to light is such a one as we have discussed in
this article, one which might bring to light a criminal infraction of law in a different and independent jurisdiction, it would
be necessary to show that the reason relied on to compel the
witness to testify was as broad as the privilege of which he
was deprived.
It has been suggested that the kind of statute in question
might be made effective by both the United States and all the
states uniting in passing a similar statute which would be
broad enough to cover "any pleading and discovery or
evidence obtained from a party or witness by means of any
judicial proceeding in this or any foreign state or country
shall be given in evidence, etc." Granting that if such a
visionary thing were possible, the real difficulty arises in the
matter of compelling a witness to plead a pardon, acquittal,
conviction or statutes of limitation or of immunity which may
effect him in another jurisdiction. So long as the court must
take judicial notice of a statute as a Federal statute in both
Federal and state courts then this difficulty will not arise.
But no sooner does the opposite rule come into effect, that a
court does not take judicial notice of the various statutes and
judicial acts, then the witness who does not wish to give testimony against himself may plead the statute of the state
Reg. v. Boyes, IOx R. C. L. 327; Weldon v. Burch, 12 Ill. 374; Wil2 Cox Chan. 202; Roberts v. Allat, 22 U. C. L. 288;
People v. Mather, 4 Wend. 252; State v. Wharton, 3 S. W. (Tenn.) 490;
Manchester R. R. Co. v. Concord R. R. Co., 2o AUt. (N. H.) 383; Child
v. Merrill, 66 Vt 302.
2Salina
Bank v. Henry, 3 Denio, 593; Southern R. R. News Co. v.

liams v. Farrington,

Russell, 91 Ga. 8o8.
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where he may be convicted of some crime as to which he is
asked to testify, and though it may be possible he. cannot be
prosecuted in that state, for that crime, in any court in that
state, the court cannot take judicial notice of the fact nor can
the accused be compelled to plead it.' With such a state of
facts a state statute of the kind in question would be unconstitutional, and the whole fabric so carefully woven would fall
to pieces. We believe we have shown that, except for the
case of Brown v. Walker, it is impossible for either the state
or Federal Government to grant "absolute immunity," and
this case, it seems to us, upon another hearing of the same
proposition, could not be decided in the same way. It is not
necessary, therefore, in order to show that statutes of immunity or indemnity are unconstitutional, to refer to the doubtful
and speculative arguments, as to whether a witness will be
compelled to testify to such matters as will disgrace him in the
eyes of his neighbors; nor is it necessary to determine whether
the framers of the Constitution intended that the declaration
that "No man shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself," might be annulled by granting immunity.
Since the Counselman case, stpra, has thrown the weight
of its authority on the side of the right of the witness called
to testify to matters which will tend to incriminate him, the
true rule undoubtedly is, that a statute of indemnity must
furnish absolute immunity. This means that a person cannot
be compelled to testify if there is any possible way in which
his answers may tend to incriminate him in the jurisdiction in
which he is called, orin anyother jurisdiction, provided hebrings
it to the knowledge of the court that he is opening the way for a
prosecution in such otherjurisdiction. This immunity the courts
have declared to be the measure of the ancient common law rule
as it is declared in the Constitution of the United States.
Although the legislatures of the various states or, Congress,
may change or abrogate a common law privilege, they cannot
change a constitutional provision, at least, without granting an
equivalent. This, we believe, we have shown they cannot do.
CharlesE. Lahman.

Chicago, December, I898.
I Wilson v. United States, 7 Peters,
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